Crisis Management in Federal States

Intergovernmental councils exist in all multilevel systems (Behnke & Mueller, 2017; Poirier et al., 2015). Via these councils, governments harmonize policy, pool resources, and exchange information. Given the cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional character of crisis management and because decisions are very politicized and highly consequential, the peak council of a federation can be expected to take the lead among intergovernmental councils in coordinating crisis management.

Coordination occurred in all federations, though to different degrees. Intergovernmental councils were the main institutions through which the federal government and the constituent units coordinated their crisis responses. 

We investigate whether peak councils really assume a leading role during the COVID-19 pandemic. To this end, we compare their role during the COVID-19 pandemic to “normal” times. The empirical analysis focuses on Germany and Switzerland, that is two federations with highly institutionalized systems of intergovernmental councils (Bolleyer, 2006; Hegele & Behnke, 2013). It examines and compares the role of the German Conference of Premiers of the Länder (Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz, MPK; created in 1948 and institutionalized in 1954) and the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Governments (Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen, KdK; established in 1993). MPK consists of the heads of government (the premiers) of the Länder. Although the federal government is not a formal member, two of MPK’s four annual meetings are followed by a meeting with the federal chancellor, who convenes it (Lhotta & von Blumenthal, 2015). In contrast to MPK, membership of KdK consists of the collegial governments of the cantons, with each of them deciding from meeting to meeting who should attend plenary assemblies (Schnabel & Mueller, 2017). A representative of the federal government may be invited as a guest to exchange information. 

To establish whether MPK and KdK took a leading role in coordinating crisis responses we measure and compare their level of activity, publicity, purpose, and the bindingness of outputs of the peak councils with the level of activity, publicity, purpose, and the bindingness of outputs of the relevant sectoral councils in normal times and during the pandemic. The analysis draws on an original dataset containing more than 900 written council outputs.

Our findings show that MPK took a leading role during the COVID-19 pandemic, a role that was indeed unusual when compared to normal times—and when compared to its Swiss counterpart. KdK does not play a leading role in normal times and did not during the COVID-19 crisis either.

Given the cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional character of crisis management and because decisions are very politicized and highly consequential, the peak council of a federation can be expected to take the lead among intergovernmental councils in coordinating crisis management. However, whether or not this expectation materializes in a particular federation, is a function of its existing executive arrangements.

Consequently, our expectation that during the COVID-19 pandemic peak councils played an elevated role among the councils is only partially confirmed. That MPK took a leading role while KdK did not suggests that the differences between the two federations regarding their executive arrangements influenced the role the peak council plays during a crisis. In line with the more hierarchical relationship between the heads of government and cabinet ministers in Germany, MPK ensured cross-sectoral as well as intergovernmental coordination. In Switzerland, where the head of government is only primus inter pares—and may not even be the person who represents the cantonal government at KdK meetings—the coordination of crisis management was organized along sectoral lines. Hence, KdK was sidelined by GDK. 

Notes

1.  Parts of this text were published in Schnabel, J., Freiburghaus, R., & Hegele, Y. (2022). Crisis management in federal states: The role of peak intergovernmental councils in Germany and Switzerland during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Dms–Der Moderne Staat–Zeitschrift Für Public Policy, Recht Und Management, 15(1), 42–61.
2. The original research carried out together with our co-author Rahel Freiburghaus, may be accessed at https://doi.org/10.3224/dms.v15i1.10.

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